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REVIVING FAIR USE:  
WHY SONY’S EXPANSION OF FAIR USE SPARKED  
THE FILE-SHARING CRAZE 
 
Christopher Alan Hower* 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1492, everyone believed the world was flat. In 1984, the Supreme Court tried to 
convince us that time-shifting is fair use.1 Prior to this ruling, copyright holders enjoyed the right 
to control access to their work under a statutory monopoly.2 The Supreme Court upset this state 
of affairs by granting an unprecedented extension of power to consumers to infringe copyrighted 
works.3 Justice Stevens characterized this ruling as a backlash against industry’s desire to 
“control the way [consumers watch] television,” when in actuality it was the Court controlling 
the way artists could provide access to their works.4 
 
In effect, videotape recording of television programming deprived copyright owners of 
the right to market convenience for their content, and instead granted the benefit solely to 
technology producers.5 Videotape recording not only disproportionately advantaged technology 
producers at the expense of artists,6 but also led consumers to feel entitled to an unwarranted 
level of control over access to copyrighted works.7 With the ability to decide on what terms they 
would watch television programming, it is no surprise that many viewers and listeners felt 
justified participating in unauthorized file-sharing.8 Record labels and publishers could not react 
fast enough to a new market for online sales, similar to how movie studios could not react fast 
enough to the technological development of the home videotape recorder market. Consequently, 
consumers decided to exploit the “right” to infringe copyrighted works granted by the Court, 
resulting in substantial harm to artists. 
 
This comment first discusses the development of the fair use affirmative defense and how 
courts attempted to apply the defense to emerging technologies. Next, this comment proposes a 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate 2007, George Washington University Law School; B.S., University of Florida. Christopher Hower 
is a registered patent agent. He would like to thank his former copyright law and current intellectual property 
seminar professor, Professor Ralph Oman, for providing guidance and perspective of copyright law, as well as its 
policy implications and the legislative process. 
1 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (hereinafter “Sony III”). 
2 Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.917, 944 (Summer 2005) (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 
457–93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
3 Sony III, 464 U.S. 417. 
4 Litman, supra note 2, at 932 (citing 1st draft, Memorandum of Justice Stevens, Sony III (No. 81-1687) (circulated 
June 13, 1983) at 22). 
5 Id. at 944 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 457–93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
6 Maribel Rose Hilo, Tivo and the Incentive/Dissemination Conflict: The Economics of Extending Betamax to 
Personal Video Recorders, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 1043, 1056 (Winter 2003) (citing Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600, 1630-31 (1982)). 
7 Litman, supra note 2, at 944 (citing Sony III at 457–93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
8 Id. 
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legislative remedy for the current misapplication of fair use. Finally, this comment concludes 
with the justification and effects of such legislation. 
 
I. Background 
 
A. Sony: Stealing Control for the First Time 
 
1. The District Court 
 
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America, content owners Universal 
City Studios, Inc. and Walt Disney Productions, Inc. sued Sony Corporation and its distributor 
Sony Corporation of America for direct and indirect copyright infringement caused by allowing 
consumers to infringe copyright owners’ reproduction right with the Betamax device.9 Sony 
alleged that home recording was not infringement and that even if it was that no theory of 
infringement or vicarious liability could hold Sony responsible.10 Additionally, Sony argued that 
its videotape recorders were a staple article of commerce, rendering Sony exempt from 
contributory liability under the staple article of commerce doctrine from patent law.11 
 
Videotape recorders, such as the Betamax machines, introduced consumers to a level of 
control over television content never before imagined by allowing a user to record a television 
broadcast off-the-air.12 Prior to this innovation, broadcasters dictated when and what television 
programs viewers could watch, but the Betamax enabled viewers to create a copy of a broadcast 
television program on tape cassettes.13 Furthermore, the Betamax allowed users to skip 
commercials using the pause and fast forward functions.14 Sony also invited the public to “record 
favorite shows” or “build a library” without warning that creating copies of copyrighted works 
may be copyright infringement.15 
 
Universal and Disney proffered evidence documenting several accounts of consumers’ 
copying activity such as time-shifting16 and creating libraries of their favorite shows.17 Survey 
evidence indicated that a substantial amount of consumers owned a large number of videotape 
                                                 
9 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (hereinafter “Sony I”), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (Sony III). 
10 Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 433. 
11 Id. at 459–461 (describing how the contribution made by a staple article of commerce towards infringement is 
insufficient to establish contributory liability without impermissibly expanding infringement beyond precedent and 
judicial management). 
12 Id. at 435 (describing how consumers could record off-the-air broadcasts manually, or set timers to record for 
remote recording). 
13 Id. (noting that tapes are not universally compatible with videotape recorders, and that at the time of litigation the 
highest-capacity tapes cost twenty one dollars each and record three hours of video). 
14 Id. at 435–36 (clarifying that pause allows a user to omit commercials if the user is present throughout the 
recording, and that a user can skip commercial segments by fast forwarding during playback). 
15 Id. at 436 (stipulating that Sony reimbursed merchandise to an individual franchise dealer for creating 
advertisements using “record your favorite show” and “build a library” language). 
16 Id. at 465 (defining time-shifting as “[r]ecording off-the-air while not viewing the program, watching the copy 
within a short period of time and erasing it thereafter”; recording a program while watching it is considered 
infringing activity). 
17 Id. at 436–38 (confirming that users created copies of copyrighted television programs and movies owned by 
Universal and Disney). 
Copyright © 2008, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
7 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 77 
cassettes, did not engage exclusively in time-shifting, and engaged in activities to avoid 
commercial advertisements.18 Despite the survey evidence, Universal and Disney were not able 
to establish measurable economic loss at the time of trial, though they did present expert 
testimony alleging prospective harm to the value of their copyrights.19  
 
The District Court examined the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners20 and 
determined that Congress did not intend to protect copyright holders’ right of reproduction with 
respect to videotape recorders because of enforcement problems discussed in the legislative 
history.21 Next, the District Court outlined the four factors of the fair use balancing test: (1) the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.22 Walking 
through the analysis, the court concluded that time-shifting is fair use because it is a 
noncommercial use of copyrighted material and has no effect on the market for such material.23  
 
Next, the court held that Sony lacked sufficient knowledge of the infringing activity to be 
contributorily liable, even though Sony knew “that the main use of the Betamax would be to 
record copyrighted works off-the-air and that such recording is a copyright infringement.”24 
Instead, the court introduced the staple article of commerce defense from patent law to justify 
that “commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers of staple items were held liable as 
contributory infringers whenever they ‘constructively’ knew that some purchasers on some 
occasions would use their product for a purpose which a court later deemed, as a matter of first 
impression, to be an infringement.”25 Similarly, the court declined to impose vicarious liability 
upon Sony because it found that Sony had neither a direct financial interest in consumers’ 
infringing activities, nor the right and ability to supervise the infringing activities.26 
 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
18 Id. at 438–39 (finding that both plaintiff’s and defendant’s surveys revealed that the average consumer owned 
31.73 videotape cassettes, 29.6% of viewers watched recorded programs more than once, 41.7% of owners regularly 
eliminated commercials from the recordings, and between 26.4% and 43.9% of interviewees used fast forward to 
skip commercials often). 
19 Id. at 439–40 (predicting that the Betamax would diminish the public’s interest in watching reruns, decrease the 
size of live television audiences, and result in fewer film rentals). 
20 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (focusing on the exclusive rights to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords and to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work).  
21 Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 446 (analyzing the difficulty of managing privacy interests in monitoring home-use 
recording, which the infringement rendered uncontrollable and therefore outside the scope of copyright legislation). 
22 Id. at 338 (noting that the statute codifies the factors presented in Williams & Wilkins v. United States, 487 F.2d 
1345, 1352 (1973)); 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
23 Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 456 (rationalizing that the potential for future harm, the fact that studios broadcast the 
works for free, recording occurs in private homes, and that consumers copy the work in its entirety for a private use 
equates to a fair use). 
24 Id. at 459 (citing deposition testimony by Sony executives). 
25 Id. at 461. 
26 Id. (believing that a jamming system is outside the scope of Sony’s ability to enforce, and that Sony profits from 
the sale of tapes regardless of their subsequent use). 
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On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the court concluded that time-shifting constituted an 
infringement27 and failed the fair use balancing test.28 The court focused on Congress’s broad 
legislative language, reasoning that Congress intended to cover current and future technology 
subject to specific exceptions that did not include time-shifting.29 The court specified that 
exemption from liability extends only to “productive uses,” which involve a second author’s use 
of a first author’s work.30 The court determined that fair use does not extend to “ordinary uses.”31 
Walking through the fair use factors, the Ninth Circuit articulated that copying the entirety of an 
entertaining work for convenience weighs against finding a fair use because it “tends to diminish 
or prejudice the potential sale” of a work.32 
 
As a result of the fair use analysis, the court held Sony liable as a contributory infringer.33 
Wholly rejecting the “staple article of commerce” defense imported from patent law by the 
District Court, the Ninth Circuit distinguished videotape recorders from cameras or 
photocopying machines because videotape recorders primarily reproduce television 
programming, nearly all of which is copyrighted.34 Confronting the difficulty of fashioning an 
appropriate remedy, the court conceded that an injunction may result in great public injury and 
that more appropriate relief may include damages or a continuing royalty.35 
 
3. The Supreme Court 
 
a. The Majority Opinion 
 
Reciting the District Court’s factual findings in painstaking detail, in a five-to-four split 
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, claiming that imposing liability upon Sony would 
impermissibly expand the scope of copyright protection.36 According to the Court, the public 
benefit from the dissemination of works justified construing copyright protection against the 
copyright holder.37 Turning to secondary liability, the Court determined that Sony did not 
                                                 
27 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 1981) (hereinafter “Sony II”) 
(interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act to deny a fair use defense for off-the-air copying). 
28 Id. at 971–72 (disallowing the fair use defense for unproductive uses, such as reproducing copyrighted material 
“for its intrinsic use”). 
29 Id. at 967 (acknowledging that language permitting libraries to make off-the-air videotape recordings of newscasts 
for research purposes “is intended to preclude performance, copying, or sale, whether or not for profit, by the 
recipient of a copy of a television broadcast taped off-the-air pursuant to this clause”). 
30 Id. at 970 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: ‘Fair Use’ Looks Different on Videotape, 66 VA. L. 
REV. 1005, 1011-12 (1980) (establishing that the traditional applications of fair use deal with productive uses)). 
31 Id. (quoting Leon Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright at 24 (1978) (confirming that copying for an 
ordinary use results in ordinary infringement)). 
32 Id. at 972-74 (quoting 3 Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.05[E][4][c] at 13-84 (1981)).  
33 Id. at 975-76 (finding that Sony knew infringement existed because the Betamax functions mainly to create a copy 
of copyrighted material, and that Sony materially contributed to the infringing conduct through sufficient 
commercial engagement). 
34 Id. at 975 (concluding that videotape recorders are not suitable for substantial noninfringing uses, regardless of 
whether some copyright owners choose not to protect their rights). 
35 Id. at 976 (favoring a reasonable royalty, and reprimanding Sony for “[expecting] a return on investment from 
activities which violate the copyright laws”). 
36 Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984) (focusing on the benefit of an expanded audience for time-shifted programs 
and the lack of present economic harm in justifying the reversal). 
37 Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
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intentionally induce its customers to infringe copyrights.38 Additionally, the Court adopted the 
“staple article” defense from patent law for contributory copyright infringement, which dictates 
that a device need “merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses” in order to escape 
liability.39 In the Court’s view, a copying device will not infringe copyrights if it is merely 
“capable of substantial noninfringing use.”40 Refusing to define what constitutes “substantial 
noninfringing uses,”41 the Court held that under this standard Sony is not liable as a contributory 
infringer because the Betamax is capable of at least one noninfringing use.42  
 
 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court first addressed authorized time-shifting.43 
Focusing on the benefit conferred to copyright owners who permit time-shifting by expanding 
their audience, the majority recognized that copyright owners who permit time-shifting create a 
substantial market for noninfringing uses.44 Furthermore, it continued that even unauthorized 
time-shifting did not infringe.45 Discarding a “productive use” restriction, the Court reasoned that 
time-shifting is not done for a profit, and the purpose of time-shifting permits copying an entire 
work because private home use is why stations broadcast the work.46 Moreover, the majority 
held that Universal and Disney failed to prove that a likelihood of future harm exists, and 
established the legal precedent that unauthorized time-shifting is a fair use.47 
 
b. Justice Blackmun’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
Contrariwise, Justice Blackmun agreed with the Ninth Circuit, concluding that time-
shifting infringes copyrighted works, fails the fair use balancing test, and renders Sony liable for 
infringement.48 Justice Blackmun asserted that the majority evaded its duty to the law in refusing 
to confront the tough copyright issues presented in the case.49 
                                                 
38 Id. at 439 n.19 (ignoring the findings of the district court, which evidence that Betamax advertisements 
encouraged library building, which is an infringing use regardless of the interpretation of time-shifting). 
39 Id. at 443 (lowering the bar for equipment manufacturers, who must only demonstrate that their device be capable 
of operation without infringing--a standard that is almost impossible to for a manufacturer to fail). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (disregarding the district court’s factual findings demonstrating a significant number of infringing uses). 
42 Id. at 456 (proffering that because some copyright holders do not object to time-shifting and because Universal 
and Disney did not show a likelihood of harm to the potential market for their works, Sony is not a contributory 
infringer). 
43 Id. at 443 (emphasizing that Universal and Disney own fewer than ten percent of the market share for television 
programming). 
44 Id. at 447 n.28 (“they have created a substantial market for a paradigmatic noninfringing use of Sony’s product”). 
But see, Id. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“the fact that a given market for a copyrighted work would not be 
available to the copyright holder were it not for the infringer’s activities does not permit the infringer to exploit that 
market without compensating the copyright holder” (citing Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. 
American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (CA2 1980)). 
45 Id. at 447 (applying the fair use doctrine to unauthorized time-shifting). 
46 Id. at 449–50 (presuming fair use when the copyist does not profit). 
47 Id. at 451 (shifting the burden of proof to the copyright owner to show “by a preponderance of the evidence” that 
future harm is likely when the use of a copyrighted work is noncommercial). 
48 Id. at 457–500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
49 Id. at 458 (identifying with the Ninth Circuit that finding fair use merely sidesteps the difficulty in fashioning a 
remedy). 
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After detailing his own version of the facts, Justice Blackmun determined that time-
shifting constituted infringement of copyright works.50 With respect to motion pictures, he noted 
that “mere duplication of a copy may constitute an infringement even if it is never viewed.”51 
Proceeding to the fair use analysis, the dissenting Justices rejected applying the defense to 
unproductive uses. Justice Blackmun reasoned that that no court ever found fair use when the 
reproduction benefited only the user.52 Attacking the majority view that time-shifting is fair use 
because television programs are broadcast for free over-the-air, Justice Blackmun employed a 
powerful analogy: “Although a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this fact is equally 
irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library may not be copied any more freely than a 
book that is purchased.”53 For a plaintiff to meet his burden of proof, the dissent would require 
only proof of potential harm to the value of the work.54 According to the dissent, a market for 
Betamax machines inherently constitutes proof of harm to the potential market for copyrighted 
works.55  
 
Having determined that time-shifting infringes a copyright owner’s works, Justice 
Blackmun would have upheld the Ninth Circuit and found Sony liable for “induc[ing] and 
materially contribut[ing] to the infringing conduct of Betamax owners.”56 The dissent reasoned 
that Sony knew that infringement occurred because the intended use of the Betamax is off-the-air 
recording, and it is not necessary to know that the infringing activity is a copyright violation; one 
only needs to know that the infringing act takes place.57 In addition, Sony encouraged infringing 
activity by advertising without warning of possible copyright infringement.58 
 
The dissenting Justices saw no need to employ the staple article of commerce to 
copyright law, which is based on patent law principles.59 However, in an effort to foster 
commerce, Justice Blackmun proposed that “if a significant portion of the product’s use is 
noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers cannot be held contributorily liable for the product’s 
infringing uses.”60 He continued to say that in order to resolve the present issue, the entire market 
                                                 
50 Id. at 464–70 (rejecting that neither the statute nor its legislative history suggest “any intent to create a general 
exemption for a single copy made for a personal or private use”). 
51 Id. at 474 (quoting Register’s Supplementary Report 16). 
52 Id. at 479 (citing Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (1973), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 
(1975)). 
53 Id. at 480 (reiterating a copyright owners’ exclusive right to control reproduction of a work). 
54 Id. at 482 (calculating that while little harm may currently result from an isolated use, on aggregate, these uses 
may multiply to a great harm in the future). 
55 Id. at 485 (advancing that the Betamax deprives copyright owners from charging a price for convenient access to 
their works). 
56 Id. at 489–90 (explaining that contributory liability in copyright depends neither on formal control over the 
infringer nor actual knowledge of particular instances of infringement). 
57 Id. at 489 (outlining a reduction in damages for unintentional infringement in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), but no 
general exemption from liability); see also Sony II, 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir. 1981). 
58 Sony III, 464 U.S. at 489–90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1979) 
(finding that Sony advertised the Betamax by encouraging consumers to record “favorite shows,” and “classic 
movies”)). 
59 Id. at 490–91 (noting that patent law and copyright law evolved separately and distinctly from one another). 
60 Id. at 491 (suggesting that where one would not buy a product for a use other than infringing activity, the 
manufacturer cannot escape liability). 
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must be considered, not merely the share of the plaintiff’s works.61 Thus, the availability of the 
staple defense depends on the quantum of infringing use of a device in the entire market.62 
Echoing the Ninth Circuit, the dissent posited that the majority refrained from finding liability to 
escape the difficulty in fashioning an appropriate remedy.63 Discussing the four fair use factors 
once more, the dissent first advanced that the consumptive use of time-shifting is hardly 
noncommercial because the benefit accrues to the user rather than others.64 Next, Justice 
Blackmun stated that the second and third factors negate finding fair use because television 
programming is highly creative and copied in its entirety.65 Finally, he concluded that current 
harm exists because the value in a copyright would increase for compensation due to time-
shifting.66 
 
B. Repercussions: Consumers Steal Control on Their Own 
 
This section observes effects the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony III had on fair use and 
emerging technologies. First, this section details the Ninth Circuit approach to the fair use 
defense and how it declined to apply fair use to new internet technologies.67 Next, this section 
observes how the Seventh Circuit imposed secondary liability on a defendant in the presence of 
“substantial noninfringing uses” more favorable than those found in Sony.68 Finally, this section 
revisits the fair use defense with the Supreme Court’s addition of intent as a factor to be 
considered in the fair use defense analysis.69 
 
1. Napster 
 
a. The District Court 
 
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., several record companies sued Napster, Inc., an 
internet start-up company, for creating a program that enabled users to download music files 
without payment to the music industry.70 The District Court declined to expand the “fair use” 
doctrine from Sony III, and granted a preliminary injunction against Napster from engaging or 
                                                 
61 Id. at 492 n.44 (criticizing the majority for excusing Sony from liability because Universal and Disney do not own 
a large amount of the television programming market). 
62 Id. at 492 (stating that the amount of television programming that is copyrighted is irrelevant, and observing that 
the district court declined to inquire what proportion of Betamax usage is illegal). 
63 Id. at 493–94 (lambasting the majority’s justification that finding infringement would frustrate those copyright 
owners who permit time-shifting). 
64 Id. at 496 (analogizing this interpretation to a jewelry thief who wears the stolen goods rather than selling them). 
65 Id. at 496–97 (indicating that fair use extends more to informational works, and permits copying only the amount 
necessary to further an author’s own creative endeavor). 
66 Id. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (embracing the cost of convenience as the price time-shifting denies 
copyright owners). 
67 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (hereinafter “Napster I”), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (hereinafter “Napster II”). 
68 In Re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (hereinafter “Aimster”), cert denied, Deep v. 
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004). 
69 See, generally, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (hereinafter 
“Grokster”). 
70 Napster I, 114 F.Supp.2d at 1004. 
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assisting others in “copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted 
music without the express permission of the rights owner.”71 
 
Offering its file-sharing software free of charge, Napster provided search and browse 
functions for locating music files without regard to the copyright status of the files.72 Napster 
indexed lists of shared files on the user’s computer and transmitted this data to a master server, 
which coordinated communication between users and facilitated their searches.73 The Napster 
system worked as follows: Napster’s software allowed users to search for a file, Napster’s server 
answered the search by providing a list of all other users with the desired music file, and the user 
who requested the search then initiated a connection to download the music file from the selected 
source.74 
 
The plaintiffs planned or had already attempted to offer their own authorized digital 
downloading.75 Digital music offered by the plaintiffs typically contained watermarks, 
encryption, or other limitations that cause a download to expire after a certain time, whereas files 
obtained through Napster had no restrictions.76 Napster’s unrestricted music distribution 
allegedly harmed plaintiffs by decreasing album sales in college markets, thwarting plaintiffs’ 
own efforts to begin digital music sales, and disrupting plaintiffs’ promotional efforts in 
releasing restricted downloads.77 Notably, the court pointed out testimony of one expert who 
claimed that “[Napster] has contributed to a new attitude that digitally-downloaded songs ought 
to be free—an attitude that creates formidable hurdles for the establishment of a commercial 
downloading market.”78  
 
 The court concluded that the commercially significant use of Napster’s file-sharing 
program involved unauthorized transfers of copyrighted music without considering whether such 
transfers constituted fair use, or whether the staple article of commerce doctrine exempted 
Napster from liability.79 Going through the fair use balancing test, for the first factor the court 
held that the nature of the use weighed against fair use because users got something for free that 
they would ordinarily pay for, even if the users did not themselves sell the downloaded music.80 
Next, the court found that both the inherent creativity of music and copying the entire song 
weighed against finding fair use for the second and third factors concerning the nature and extent 
                                                 
71 Id. at 900–01. 
72 Id. at 905 (acknowledging that the software permits users to share their own music files). 
73 Id. at 905–06 (indicating that Napster maintains an ongoing interaction with its users, updating lists of each user’s 
shared files when they log in and sign off). 
74 Id. at 906 (qualifying that Napster does not store music files on its own server, but facilitates establishing 
connections between users logged in to the system). 
75 Id. at 908 (detailing entry into the online marketplace by BMG Music, EMI Recorded Music, North America, 
Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Records, Warner Music Group and others). 
76 Id. at 909 (emphasizing the need for restrictions to prevent copyright infringement). 
77 Id. at 909–11 (reviewing survey evidence that indicated a decrease in sales near the most “wired” colleges). 
78 Id. at 910–11 (indicating that consumers may feel entitled to a level of control over copyrights that has no lawful 
precedent or other justification). 
79 Id. at 912 (enunciating that the defendant must prove an affirmative defense such as fair use or the staple article of 
commerce doctrine after having established that direct infringement exists). 
80 Id. at 912 (announcing that at a minimum, sharing files cannot be considered a private use). 
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of the use.81 Finally, the court addressed potential harm to the market for the copyrighted work 
and decided against finding fair use because users obtained songs that they would otherwise have 
to pay for.82 The court noted that even if record sales increased when a user downloaded a song 
or eventually bought the album legitimately, positive impacts on the market do not mitigate 
potential market harm or excuse infringement.83 Additionally, Napster could not claim protection 
under the staple article of commerce doctrine because space-shifting84 did not constitute a 
substantial enough use of Napster’s software, and because Napster provided a service that it 
maintained control over.85 
 
 After finding that file downloading constituted direct infringement on behalf of third 
party users, the court held that Napster was liable for such third party use both contributorily and 
vicariously. The court reasoned that Napster had reason to know of users’ direct infringement 
because of internal documents, RIAA notices of infringement, and exemplary screenshots that 
displayed infringing files.86 Napster also contributed to the infringement because Napster 
actively facilitated the infringement.87 Finally, the court held Napster vicariously liable because 
Napster exercised control over its service and benefited financially from a large user base which 
it could commercially exploit at a later date.88 
 
b. The Ninth Circuit 
 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding Napster liable for 
contributory and vicarious infringement.89 First, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the first fair use 
factor weighed against Napster because users repeatedly exploited unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted works to avoid paying for legitimate copies.90 Second, users copied creative works 
in their entirety, tilting the second and third factors against finding fair use.91 Lastly, the Court 
determined that Napster’s offering a service for free in competition with the plaintiff’s system of 
pay-per download constituted, at the very least, a potential harm to the market for the plaintiff’s 
copyright works.92 Furthermore, the court rejected Napster’s argument that sampling93 uses were 
                                                 
81 Id. at 913 (restating that even if the first factor finds a private use, the third factor may weigh against fair use if the 
copying is likely to harm the potential market for the copyrighted works). 
82 Id. at 913–14 (rejecting Napster’s comparisons of its file transfers to promotional downloads because Napster 
downloads are permanent and unrestricted). 
83 Id. at 914 (citing Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 126 F.3d 70, 81 n.16 (2d Cir. 1997) (clarifying that 
subsequent benefit to the copyright holder does not deny entitlement to licensing fees)). 
84 Id. at 915–16 (defining space-shifting as downloading music files of songs when the user already owns the 
accompanying album). 
85 Id. at 916–17 (distinguishing Sony III, where Sony could not control the Betamax device after a sale). 
86 Id. at 918–19 (articulating that the law does not require knowledge of specific acts of infringement). 
87 Id. at 920 (analogizing Napster to the swap meet vendors in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 
(9th Cir. 1976) (finding contributory liability for swap meet operators who permitted vendors to sell counterfeit 
music recordings)). 
88 Id. at 920-21 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.3d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(reiterating that a defendant need only be capable of supervising, and that a defendant need not actually supervise)). 
89 Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
90 Id. at 1015 (indicating that “direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a commercial use”). 
91 Id. at 1016 (distinguishing Sony III as having circumstances for allowing fair use copying of a creative work in its 
entirety not present here). 
92 Id. at 1017 (reasoning that consumers would not pay for what they may obtain for free). 
93 Id. at 1018 (defining sampling as downloading a track on an evaluation basis before purchasing an album). 
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noncommercial and fair because copyright owners commercialized internet song samples and 
enjoyed the right to license their content regardless of any benefit conferred by Napster.94 
Similarly, the court did not agree that space-shifting is a fair use because users who may not own 
a legitimate copy may access all files.95 
 
 Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed contributory infringement and agreed with the lower 
court that Napster had actual and constructive knowledge of,96 and materially contributed to, its 
users’ infringement.97 Moreover, the court held Napster vicariously liable because Napster 
declined to block or remove unauthorized material because it stood to financially benefit through 
advertising as more users subscribed for access to infringing material.98 Consequently, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction, disfavoring compulsory royalties as a remedy.99 
Royalties alone would deny copyright owners their right to not license their works, in addition to 
their right to negotiate the terms of an agreement.100 
 
2. Disregarding Substantial Non-Infringing Uses in Aimster 
 
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation involved copyright owners suing another file-sharing 
program called “Aimster.”101 Aimster worked in conjunction with instant-messaging applications 
and allowed users to share files.102 Someone running Aimster would specify what files they 
wished to share, searched for a file that another Aimster user had, and initiated an encrypted 
transfer of the file.103 
 
Judge Posner concluded that Aimster contributorily infringed plaintiff’s copyrights, 
focusing on evidence that Aimster encouraged infringement, instead of focusing on Aimster’s 
failure to limit infringement.104 He explained that willful blindness constitutes knowledge in 
copyright law.105 The court found that encrypting all user transfers weighed against Aimster 
because Aimster proffered no evidence that monitoring its service would be disproportionately 
costly compared to reduced piracy rates, regardless of whether Aimster had substantial 
noninfringing uses.106 Judge Posner rebuffed Aimster’s argument that plaintiffs failed to prove 
                                                 
94 Id. (recognizing that internet sites obtained licenses to offer song samples). 
95 Id. (reconciling the space-shifting use in Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999), because in that case space-shifting occurred on a private device). 
96 Id. at 1020 (asserting that a computer system operator who knows of infringing activity and fails to remove it 
“knows of and contributes to direct infringement”). 
97 Id. (reasoning that without Napster’s service, there would not be any infringement, so Napster must necessarily 
contribute to the infringement). 
98 Id. at 1024 (tweaking the district court’s ruling because Napster could not police the content of files, but it could 
monitor file names, which must retain accuracy to search effectively). 
99 Id. at 1029 (refusing to allow Napster to avoid future injunctions, statutory damages, and criminal penalties for 
future violations). 
100 Id. 
101 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
102 Id. at 646 (articulating that a user may share with other users on his “buddy list,” or if no buddies are specified, 
all other Aimster users). 
103 Id. (acknowledging that Aimster cannot monitor what files users transfer because it encrypts all transmissions). 
104 Id. at 653 (fixating on a tutorial example that displayed only infringing material). 
105 Id. at 650 (citing Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
106 Id. at 653 (continuing that Aimster did not show how hiding the data users transfer from itself helped or saved 
costs). 
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damages because copyright law does not require established harm; instead, it allows plaintiffs to 
seek statutory damages or an injunction.107 Lastly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District 
Court’s judgment of vicarious infringement because of Aimster’s “ostrich-like refusal to 
discover the extent to which its system was being used to infringe copyright.”108 
 
3. Indirect Liability Gains Intent in Grokster 
 
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court held 
Grokster, Ltd., (“Grokster”) liable for promoting copyright infringement to distribute a device 
capable of infringement.109 Grokster completely decentralized their software, negating the need 
for intermediary servers to coordinate searches like its predecessor, Napster.110 Plaintiff Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., (“MGM”) commissioned a study concluding that copyrighted 
works constituted almost 90% of Grokster’s content.111 Additionally, through internal documents 
and advertising, Grokster heavily leveraged itself as the ultimate beneficiary of the Napster 
shutdown.112 
 
Discussing whether to hold Grokster indirectly liable, the Court discussed the tension 
between technological innovation and artistic protection.113 Overruling the lower court’s 
interpretation of Sony III, the Supreme Court clarified its precedent to limit intent inferred from 
the characteristics or uses of product but not direct evidence from the distributor.114 
Consequently, the Court reiterated the rule for inducement of infringement as “active steps . . . 
taken to encourage direct infringement,” such as advertising, instructing, or encouraging 
infringing uses.115 Three factors motivated the Justices to find indirect liability: (1) Grokster 
attempted to fill Napster’s void for copyright infringement; (2) Grokster failed to take any 
technological steps to limit infringement; and (3) Grokster profited more for each user recruited 
because of the popularity of infringement.116 
 
Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence comparing the statistics of infringement in Grokster 
to those from the Betamax, and concluded that both had similar levels of noninfringing activity 
                                                 
107 Id. at 649 (distinguishing the Justices’ reasoning in Sony III because in that case, Universal could not establish 
harm and benefited from a new market). 
108 Id. at 655 (contrasting Sony III, where the Court treated vicarious and contributory liability the same, and 
declined to recognize that Sony could have reduced the likelihood of infringement). 
109 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). 
110 Id. at 922 (conceding that Grokster has no knowledge of what or when users copied files because each user’s 
computer communicates directly with other users’ computers). 
111 Id. at 923 (comparing this result to the 87% of infringing material found in Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001)). 
112 Id. at 924–26 (elaborating how Grokster: intended to “leverage Napster’s 50 million user base;” planned to place 
an ad encouraging users to “get around” a re-launched, legal, fee-based Napster; sought to provoke an infringement 
lawsuit for publicity; strove to provide a large number of copyrighted songs; and sent newsletters extolling its ability 
to provide copyrighted works). 
113 Id. at 928–29 (considering that it may be impossible for plaintiffs to seek relief realistically, except against 
software distributors). 
114 Id. at 934 (rejecting the lower court’s ruling that Grokster is not liable because the software has substantial 
noninfringing uses). 
115 Id. at 936 (quoting Oak Industries, Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). 
116 Id. at 939–40 (establishing induced infringement from these indicia for intent with the evidence of direct 
infringement). 
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at 10% and 9%, respectively.117 He listed the noninfringing uses for Grokster and questioned 
whether to modify the Sony III rule to account for further development of such noninfringing 
activity.118 Declining to modify Sony III, he concluded that it would be premature to modify the 
rule, and that Congress is capable of weighing in if necessary.119 
 
II. Proposed Legislative Solution 
 
This legislation clarifies the guidelines for applying the fair use defense to better aid 
courts in determining when this defense should be available.120 Clear boundaries for what 
constitutes fair use will allow technological innovators to design their products accordingly and 
eliminate the uncertainty of potential infringement suits.121 However, the boundaries must strike 
a fair balance meaning that “the interests of authors must yield to the public welfare where they 
conflict.”122  
A. Legislative Text 
 
A BILL 
 To amend chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, relating to fair use as a limitation on 
exclusive rights, and for other purposes. 
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, 
 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
 This Act may be cited as the “Artists’ Rights and Technology Act of 2008.” 
 SEC. 2. FAIR USE. 
 Section 107 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting “productive” before 
“purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research.” 
 
B. Legislative Intent 
 
Here, the public interests served by the fair use exception find their roots in a quote by 
Justice Story, who first described fair use as  
 
a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of the other; 
the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the objects of each work; 
                                                 
117 Id. at 952 (Breyer, J., concurring) (inferring approximately the same amount of lawful use as found in Sony III). 
118 Id. at 954–55 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asking whether the Sony III rule succeeded in protecting new technology 
while preserving copyright protection). 
119 Id. at 965 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing other solutions to the technology/copyright tension such as suing 
direct infringers, developing anti-copying measures, and facilitating lawful downloading). 
120 See Blake Evan Reese, Fixing Through Legislative Fixation: A Call for the Codification and Modernization of 
the Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine as It Applies to Copyright Law, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 443 
(Summer 2007) (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–66 
(1992)). 
121 Id. (suggesting that clear boundaries afford greater freedom and fairness to decision-makers, immunizing them 
from arbitrary judgments). 
122 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 3-6 (1961) (considering the legislative intent 
for copyright as an economic incentive to encourage creation in order to ultimately serve the public). 
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and the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to 
the same common sources of information.”123  
 
Adding his own judicial gloss, Justice Story continued to distill precedent into the four 
factors adopted almost verbatim by Congress: “the nature and objects of the selections made, the 
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, 
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”124 With those guiding 
principles, the proposed Artists’ Rights and Technology Act of 2008 (ART Act) preserves the 
fair use doctrine to encourage authorship while establishing clear guideposts for future 
innovators.  
 
Justice Fortas spoke with great wisdom when he cautioned the Court to “do as little 
damage as possible to traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the 
Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties face.”125 
Twenty-three years ago, the Supreme Court would have better served the law by heeding this 
warning. Instead, it failed to follow its own advice to defer to Congress in the face of 
technological advancements and shifting markets.126 “[There] can be no really satisfactory 
solution to the problem presented here, until Congress acts.”127 Even the District Court in Sony I 
recognized that it had no place divining the effects that videotape recorders would have on 
copyrighted television and movie programming because courts are not suited for such economic 
predictions.128 Consequently, when the Supreme Court expanded fair use to include time-
shifting, it upset the delicate balance between technological innovation and artists’ rights.129 
Never before had the public been given so much freedom to trample the exclusive rights 
protected by copyright.130 
 
1. Productive Uses Embrace the Notion of Fair Use 
 
Case law suggests that until Sony III, courts reserved fair use solely for productive 
uses.131 This legislation codifies that distinction because Congressional studies rejected 
                                                 
123 Alan L. Durham, Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works, 81 IND. L.J. 851 (Summer 2006) (quoting 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)). 
124 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 
(C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)). 
125 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 404 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
126 Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to 
Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyright materials. Congress has the 
constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing 
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”; “defining the contours of copyright law is a job for 
Congress”). 
127 Id. at 500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 167 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)). 
128 Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 442 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (recognizing the magnitude of the implications for this new 
technology and deferring to “government commission or legislative body” to evaluate the repercussions). 
129 Id. 
130 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 910–11 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
131 Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 479 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing copying for the advancement of 
scientific research, private study or scholarship with purely personal use). 
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exempting private, unproductive uses.132 Copyright law must permit productive fair use because 
it fosters authorship by allowing borrowers to take the material necessary to complete their 
works, whereas protecting private uses becomes “a fair use subsidy at the author’s expense.”133 
 
On the other hand, unproductive, ordinary uses involve no authorship and contribute no 
greater good to society.134 The Supreme Court agreed, recognizing the important distinction 
between productive and ordinary uses.135 Indeed, an unproductive use such as time-shifting 
merely displaces the demand for the original work because an ordinary use consumes the work 
without adding any further value, and courts explicitly exempt from fair use those uses that 
displace demand for the original work.136  
 
To avoid this pitfall, Justice Blackmun suggested that ordinary uses may qualify for fair 
use after showing that no potential harm exists to the value of the owner’s work.137 However, it 
is far too difficult to prove an absence of harm to potential markets, so practical reasons alone 
favor legislatively closing this hole.138 In addition, it may be difficult or impossible to determine 
what harm exists at the time of suit, and waiting will only further damage the copyright owner’s 
position in the market.139  
 
For example, suppose a study commissioned today found that over-the-air time-shifting, 
as considered by the Court in Sony III,140 substantially diminished the demand for streaming 
web-casts of the same program. Content owners would rightly expect to capitalize on advertising 
inserted into a web-cast, similar to how commercial interruptions subsidize an original over-the-
air broadcast.141 However, time-shifting deprives the copyright owner the advertising revenue he 
is entitled to for offering a convenient web-cast service because the time-shifting displaces the 
demand for an on-demand web-cast.142 Thus, harm exists even in the vacuum of the Sony III 
majority’s idealized definition of time-shifting where no one fast-forwards, watches a program a 
second time, or records while watching the original broadcast—hardly a practical presumption 
                                                 
132 Id. at 465–66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing A. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted in 
STUDY NO. 14 FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES PREPARED FOR 
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1 (1960)). 
133 Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (concluding that home recording is an ordinary use). 
134 Id. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (comparing the benefits of criticism, education and research with a purely 
consumptive use for entertainment value). 
135 Litman, supra note 2, at 950 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
136 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. 
Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (allowing a hypothetical review to cite excerpts from a work, but 
not allowing a review to quote the most important parts of a work in order to substitute the review for the original)). 
137 Litman, supra note 2, at 950 (citing 1st Draft, Opinion in Sony (No. 81-1687 (circulated by Justice Blackmun, 
June 13, 1983) at 62). 
138 Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 497–99 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining the difficulty in finding potential 
market harm when new technology creates a new market for old copyrighted works). 
139 Litman, supra note 2, at 944 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 457–93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that 
videotape recording denies copyright owners the ability to exploit the price a viewer will pay for convenience)). 
140 Id. at 923 (citing James Lardner, Fast Forward 60–81 at 97–106 (2002) (announcing that stores across America 
sold out of blank videotapes when studios broadcast Gone with the Wind, and Disney feared copying and declined to 
broadcast movies); see also Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 436–40 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
141 Sony III, 464 U.S. at 446 n.28 (explaining that copyright owners capitalize upon television by subsidizing 
broadcasts with advertising). 
142 Id. 
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for a realistic potential market harm analysis.143 Consequently, this legislation closes the 
loophole for unproductive fair uses in order to allow artists to maximize the benefit deserved for 
their work.144 
2. Applying the Fair Use Factors under the New Statutory Scheme 
 
a. Purpose and Character of the Use 
 
The first fair use factor embraces the notion that only productive uses should warrant 
protection. In Sony III, the Supreme Court suggested that commercial uses presumptively 
weighed against a finding of fair use,145 but the Court abandoned this presumption in Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music.146 However, the Court did not abandon its presumption of harm from 
commercial exploitation; it merely clarified that it will presume harm only for unproductive 
commercial copying.147 
 
The ART Act codifies the distinction between productive and ordinary uses to guide 
courts when balancing the first fair use factor. The term “commercial” suggests an economic 
exchange without specifying whether that entails seeking a profit, denying the copyright owner 
royalties, or exacting a toll from the public.148 Under this Act, “commercial use” embodies 
transactions where an infringing copy is made without returning value to society.149 A second 
artist justifies his commercial gain in taking from an existing work by creating a new work.150 
His contribution of a new work tends to negate any unjust enrichment and renders this use 
noncommercial.151 Copyright law encourages artists to create by rewarding them 
economically,152 but occasionally the public desire for further creation mandates that an artist 
                                                 
143 Id. at 922 (citing Macy’s Sony Betamax display ad, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1976, at 13 (encouraging users to 
build “a priceless videotape library in no time”)). 
144 Id. at 927 (citing HOME RECORDING OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS: HEARINGS ON H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, 
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, AND H.R. 5705 BEFORE THE SUBCOM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG. 1-3 at 4-16, 67-115 (1982) 
(testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. and memorandum of Prof. 
Laurence H. Tribe) (“any law that exempted home videotaping from liability for copyright infringement would be an 
unconstitutional taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”)). 
145 464 U.S. at 451 (presuming likely future harm when copying is for a commercial purpose); cf., Litman, supra 
note 2, at 949 (clarifying that noncommercial uses require proof of present or potential harm but commercial uses do 
not). 
146 510 U.S. 569, 584–91 (1994) (refuting that Sony III established a presumption of harm for commercial uses); 
Litman, supra note 2, at 949; Durham, supra note 123, at 868. 
147 Durham, supra note 123, at 868 (maintaining the presumption of likely future harm for “outright duplication for 
commercial uses, as opposed to more complex situations like parody”). 
148 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2007). 
149 Durham, supra note 123, at 883 (likening copying for personal benefit to stealing). 
150 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (encouraging the promotion of science). 
151 Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy--
albeit at the first author's expense--to permit the second author to make limited use of the first author's work for the 
public good.” (citations omitted)). 
152 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, In Search of the Story: Narratives of Intellectual Property, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, 
15 (2005) (contrasting the economic motivation that guided the drafters of the Constitution with the inalienable 
personal right to a work embraced by Europe). 
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forego his usual fee.153 Value created by the new work outweighs the loss to the original artist, 
which justifies the infringing copy.154  
 
Commercial use cannot refer to whether the second work is for a profit—copyright law 
understands that every work is for a profit because every fixed work gets copyright protection to 
encourage its creation.155 Thus, the second work is always broadly “commercial” because it 
receives copyright protection automatically.156 Adding the word “productive” focuses the 
meaning of “commercial” to those uses that do not return value to society in exchange for their 
unauthorized copying, which better allows courts to make consistent decisions when applying 
the fair use defense.  
 
Consequently, the time-shifting present in Sony III constituted a commercial use despite 
taking place in private homes.157 Copying with a Betamax device does not give back to the 
public; no redeeming quality justifies fair use for such copying because a Betamax contributes no 
value to society as a whole.158 Instead of consulting a moving target like “substantial 
noninfringing uses,” exempting only productive noncommercial uses under this definition solves 
the line-drawing problem the Supreme Court had in Sony III.159 The Court’s mistake stole from 
copyright owners the right to value convenient access to their works, which instilled a sense of 
entitlement in the public to justify taking for convenience.160  
 
Unfortunately, this new attitude led consumers to take music when file-sharing offered it 
more conveniently than record labels and publishers. Similar to how many Betamax users 
infringed works under the Sony III majority’s erroneous fair use standard, 161 file-sharers infringe 
copyrighted works by downloading and keeping instead of “time-shifting” songs broadcast on 
the radio for free.162 The Supreme Court gave consumers an unjustified inch, and in return 
consumers have taken a mile. Ed. Note: while grammatically correct, this language is a bit 
clichéd. 
 
b. Nature of the Work and Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
 
                                                 
153 Sony III, 464 U.S. at 478. 
154 Id. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 
503, 511 (1945) ("The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors. 'A dwarf 
standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.'")). 
155 Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 152. 
156 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression”). 
157 Durham, supra note 123, at 880 (classifying home taping as copying). 
158 Litman, supra note 2, at 928 (explaining that the Betamax creates a more convenient copy for personal use with 
no compensation for the work’s owner). 
159 A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 47, 78 (1989) (speculating that the majority would have been different if more evidence showed more 
“librarying” Betamax usage). 
160 Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (describing how the Betamax granted additional control over 
programming to consumers). 
161 Reese, supra note 120, at 467 (noting that at least 25 percent of Betamax users fast-forwarded through 
commercials). 
162 Litman, supra note 2, at 953 (detailing that most consumers build music libraries rather than time-shift). 
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With no discernable effect on the second and third fair use factors, the ART Act leaves 
little to discuss here. Even the overly-broad application of fair use by the Sony III majority 
struggled to conclude that copying a creative work in its entirety does not weigh against fair 
use.163 Productive uses justify copying only to the extent necessary to create the new work,164 so 
these provisions continue to protect creative works independent of any new technology. 
 
c. Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market or Value of the Work 
 
The ART Act eliminates unproductive uses from claiming fair use because unproductive 
uses harm the potential market or value of a work.165 Allowing harmful, unproductive uses to 
qualify fair use may discourage artists from creating.166 Ordinary uses may seem innocuous at 
first, but when considered in aggregate they can prove quite harmful.167  
 
Also, because fair use excuses an infringer from compensating the original artist, fair use 
presumes that the defendant harms the copyright holder.168 This presumption protects artists who 
cannot demonstrate harm when brand-new technologies facilitate copying.169 Assessing the 
effects copying technology will have on works takes time,170 but often such a delay may 
decimate a legitimate market, particularly when the market is newly formed as a result of 
technological advances.171 
 
Again, once technology enables viewers to watch programs whenever they desire, the 
market for such convenience diminishes greatly because the public is no longer motivated to pay 
for access when they can merely copy a program on its own.172 Maintaining that copying for 
                                                 
163 Oddi, supra note 159, at 62 (denigrating the majority view that offering a work at some point for free affects how 
much may be copied). 
164 Sony III, 464 U.S. 417, 496–97 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (permitting copying small excerpts to facilitate 
further authorship). 
165 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (citing 3 Nimmer § 13.05[B], at 
13–77 – 13–78 (prohibiting fair use when any rights in a copyrighted work are adversely affected)). 
166 Id. at 566 (recognizing the fourth factor as the most important in the fair use analysis); New Era Publication v. 
Carol Pub. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1990). 
167 Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 451 (maintaining that widespread use resulting 
in harm negates fair use)). 
168 Oddi, supra note 159, at 63 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 485); Litman, supra note 2, at 949–50 (citing Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (placing the burden of proof on defendant)). But see, Nation 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 567 (requiring the copyright owner to establish a loss in revenue to shift the burden to the 
infringer); Litman, supra note 2, at 944 (shifting the burden of proof to plaintiffs for noncommercial uses). 
169 Durham, supra note 123, at 884 (observing that the studios in Sony III could not initially demonstrate harm from 
time-shifting). 
170 Hilo, supra note 6, at 1056 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 497-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for not considering the future market, and myopically focusing on the current effect of time-shifting)). 
171 Seth A. Miller, Peer-to-Peer File Distribution: An Analysis of Design, Liability, Litigation, and Potential 
Solutions, 25 REV. LITIG. 181, 186–87 (Winter 2006) (citing Benny Evangelista, RIAA Smells Victory, S.F. CHRON., 
Nov. 22, 2003, at B1; Anna E. Engelman & Dale A. Scott, Arrgh! Hollywood Targets Internet Piracy, 11 RICH. J.L. 
& TECH. 3 (2004)) (attributing a decline of $2.4 billion in revenue to the music industry and $3 billion to the film 
industry from illegal downloading). 
172 Litman, supra note 2, at 941 (providing that time-shifting competes with the market for pre-recorded cassettes); 
Hilo, supra note 6, at 1064 (citing Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1630-31 (1982) (implying that 
authors will have less incentive to create when viewers command greater control over access to works)). 
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unproductive personal use is not fair use opens up a new market for revenue where the copyright 
owner can exploit the demand for the ability to create convenient copies.173 However, allowing 
ordinary copying under fair use accrues benefit to the technology rather than the content creator 
and discourages creation.174 Moreover, technology that allows unproductive copying may bypass 
advertisements,175 which could decrease advertising revenues.176 Thus, this legislation eliminates 
unproductive copying from fair use because such activity disproportionately harms copyright 
owners with no resulting benefit to society. 
 
3. Effects of This Legislation on Indirect Liability 
 
Allowing only productive fair uses will affect technology developers by imposing 
liability upon parties who were in the clear before. However, this legislation provides predictable 
results for companies to plan accordingly.177 Many ordinary uses are personal because the 
motivation is for self-gain by consuming a work. For this reason, going after direct infringers is 
overly burdensome178 and copyright holders should be able to protect their investments by 
pursuing those who facilitate or encourage infringement.179 
 
Infringement liability by inducement remains unaffected because any party encouraging 
infringement should be held liable for their acts, though more parties may be found liable given 
the productive definition of fair use.180 New technologies enable consumers to infringe easier 
today than in the past, which may weaken copyright protection.181 Any party who promotes 
infringement and compounds the harm created by advancements in copying technology will be 
held indirectly liable of inducing infringement.182 
 
                                                 
173 Oddi, supra note 159, at 64 (professing that denying fair use to time-shifting allows for exploitation by “royalties, 
fees, or other means”). But see Oddi, supra note 159, at 99–100 (citing The Sound of Money, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 
1987, at 73 (asserting that authors profit more from home video sales than first performances)). 
174 Hilo, supra note 6, at 1056 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 498 (observing that Sony benefits from the sale of 
Betamax devices and tapes, not the studios)). 
175 Id. at 1064 (declaring that eliminating commercials is both possible and easy). 
176 Id. at 1066 (inferring that advertisers would not pay as high rates if the number of viewers watching the 
advertisements decreases). 
177 Reese, supra note 120, at 478 (favoring bright-line rules for business decisions). 
178 Litman, supra note 2, at 927 (citing HOME RECORDING OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS: HEARINGS ON H.R. 4783, H.R. 
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, AND H.R. 5705 BEFORE THE SUBCOM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG. 1-3 at 4-16, 67-115 (1982) 
(testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.) which announced that the 
motion picture industry declined to pursue actions against individual infringers “now or in the future”). But see, e.g., 
Id. (proffering that the industry filed suit against consumers). 
179 Durham, supra note 123, at 881 (quoting Sony III, 464 U.S. at 442 (providing effective protection for copyrighted 
works through indirect copyright liability)). 
180 Miller, supra note 171, at 213 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 926 (extrapolating that evidence of encouraging 
infringement overcomes evidence of a product’s merely infringing capabilities)). 
181 Oddi, supra note 159, at 64 (announcing that no one induced infringement of television programming prior to the 
release of home videotape recorders). 
182 Litman, supra note 2, at 932 (citing 1st Draft, Opinion in Sony (No. 81-1687 (circulated by Justice Blackmun, 
June 13, 1983), at 32-33 (reasoning that Sony induced infringement by advertising the Betamax for recording 
“favorite shows” and “classic movies”)). 
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Similarly, this legislation does not modify existing contributory liability law or the staple 
article of commerce doctrine, but the modified definition of fair use may result in greater 
liability, because if a device is not capable of substantial noninfringing uses, courts will hold the 
manufacturer liable.183 To mitigate or even escape liability, manufacturers can implement 
technological measures to dissuade their customers from infringing copyrighted material.184 
There is no affirmative duty to take such preventative action,185 but such effort allows 
manufacturers to retain control over the use of their product lest consumers make use of it 
against the manufacturer’s intentions.186 
 
4. Re-Evaluating Remedies for Productive Fair Use 
 
Eliminating the fair use defense for ordinary uses such as time-shifting will result in more 
instances of infringement. With the influx of additional infringers, traditional remedies will not 
adequately satisfy the parties involved.187 Every act of infringement warrants minimum statutory 
damages, but these damages may be unreasonably high; new remedy schemes such as limited 
injunctions or compulsory licenses are necessary to encourage technological growth.188 
 
First, limited injunctions may provide that manufacturers found indirectly liable for 
infringement must utilize anti-infringement measures,189 or modify the culpable device in such a 
way that impedes infringing activity.190 However, in some circumstances anti-infringement 
mechanisms could present a market disadvantage and make this remedy unsuitable.191 
 
When limited injunctions provide unsatisfactory results, compulsory licensing schemes 
offer new solutions.192 Compulsory licensing is particularly attractive when “technology has 
created new uses for which the author’s exclusive rights have not been clearly established . . . 
[or] when technology has made old licensing methods for established rights ponderous or 
                                                 
183 Oddi, supra note 159, at 63 (interpreting Sony III to establish that the standard for contributory infringement is 
the amount of direct infringement). But see, id. at 56 (citing Sony III, 464 U.S. at 456 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(applying the standard for contributory infringement from trademark law to inquire whether the defendant 
“suggested, even by implication” that its customers infringe)). 
184 Id. at 90 (calculating that manufacturers can escape liability by taking their product off the market, implementing 
anti-copying measures, or seeking a license from copyright owners); cf., Reese, supra note 120, at 468 (citing In re 
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003), which allowed service providers to escape liability 
when anti-copying technology proves disproportionately costly to implement). 
185 Miller, supra note 171, at 186-87 (discussing Cal. Penal Code 653aa (West 2005), which criminalizes file-sharing 
applications that do not include anti-copying measures). 
186 But see, Oddi, supra note 159, at 89–90 (imposing a general duty on VCR sellers to not permit customers to 
infringe). 
187 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000) (providing for statutory damages in the range of $750 to $30,000 at the court’s 
discretion, and as low as $200 or high as $150,000 if the infringer unintentionally or willfully infringed, 
respectively). 
188 Hilo, supra note 6, at 1056 (discussing royalty schemes for infringement in Austria and Germany). 
189 Oddi, supra note 159, at 91–97 (advocating “playback only” systems, degrading copy quality, or engineering 
devices incapable of copying copyrighted content directly from a source). 
190 Id. at 99 (discussing how studios did not object to the sale of Betamax recorders with no tuners). 
191 Id. at 91 (analyzing how the VCR eliminated the market for the playback-only videodisc format). 
192 Hilo, supra note 6, at 1053 (reiterating that Sony III, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), did not overturn the 9th Circuit’s 
continuing royalties remedy in Sony II, 659 F.2d 963); see also, Litman, supra note 2, at 927–28 (indicating support 
from the motion picture industry for compulsory licenses on video recorders and blank cassette tapes). 
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inefficient.”193 Indeed, this approach proved successful in many foreign members of the Berne 
Convention, and should likewise do well in the United States.194 
 
Conclusion 
 
Expanding the fair use defense beyond its intended confines over-extended consumer 
control of access to copyrighted works.195 This additional control trampled on artists’ rights to 
lawfully exploit their works, and encouraged consumers to take like never before.196 Before 
artists lose the incentive to create, Congress should address the current consumer climate of 
indifference and the resulting rampant infringement. Currently, content providers stand to lose 
substantial revenue to technologies that enable widespread infringement of perfect copies with 
unparalleled ease.197 After the Supreme Court granted consumers the “right” to control access to 
copyrighted works, consumers naturally grew to expect similar unrestrained access to all media. 
Congress should adopt the ART Act to restore fair use to its role protecting and encouraging 
authorship and put an end to harmful “convenience theft.” 
                                                 
193 Hilo, supra note 6, at 1065 (quoting Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in 
Copyright Law, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 203, 209 (1982)). 
194 Id. at 1056 (noting that Sony III, 464 U.S. at 499 n.51, considered royalty schemes for infringement in Austria 
and Germany). 
195 Sony I, 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (explaining how consumers could decide when to view content). 
196 See generally, Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005); Aimster, 334 F.3d 
643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
197 See, e.g., Id. at 1057-66 (observing that personal video recording devices skip commercials with ease); Amy 
Harmon, Skip-the-Ads Has Madison Ave. Upset, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2002, at A1 (discussing devices that enable 
consumers to record programs without commercials); Christine Caulfield, XM Invokes Home Recording Law in 
Copyright Suit, IP LAW 360, July 5, 2007, http://ip.law360.com/Secure/printview.aspx?id=28709 (detailing 
potential infringement for satellite radio tuners capable of recording music in a digital format). 
